Russian SEAD DEAD in Ukraine
Russias War in Ukraine 2022
The importance of SEAD/ DEAD operations
The problem arises
The reasons why Russia can‘t SEAD/ DEAD
Consequences of Russian insufficient SEAD/ DEAD capabilities
Whats about the Russian stealth fighters?
Russia does have the capability for limited SEAD/ DEAD
One of the most important tasks of an air force in a war is to gain air superiority over the territory of the enemy. Thus it can eleminate threats for the groud forces, like tanks or artillery, while these ground forces themselves can stay out of range, don‘t need to approach into the range of their own artillery or their tanks. As seen in Ukraine, air superiority can also be decisive in the case that the enemy is dependent on weapons deliveries from abroad, as General James Hecker, Commander of the US Air Forces in Europe and of NATO's Allied Air Command, said at the end of June 2023: "All the equipment that the 45 nations have offered Ukraine and trucked in would never have gotten there if Russia had air superiority," he said. "They would have had close air support aircraft right on the border of Poland and Romania, over the lines of communications, and as soon as it crossed the border it would have been done." (1) But of course, not only the weapons delivered from abroad would become targets, but also weapons transfered towards the frontlines within the country. Or the depots where they are stored. As well as fuel storage for example, or railway hubs, disrupting supplies in general. Not to forget the enemy command posts.
The problem arises
The cause why Russia doesn‘t have this air superiority is not so much because of the planes they have in comparison to those of Ukraine: With about 1.000 modern aircraft of at least the fourth generation (2) the Russian aerospace force VKS (Воздушно-космические силы) is much stronger than the smaller and older Ukrainian Air Force. Among them are, at the beginning of 2023 (3), 112 Su-34 and 99 Su-35S, which are even considered as fourth generation ++ and five (4) or six (5) Su-57 of the fifth generation, in April 2025 there were already 24 active(!) Su-57 in service (6) (total number higher), plus perhaps two new ones showed in April but without official confirmation that they were really new (7).
On 24 February 2022 Russia began its air campaign with the launch of 160 or more missiles like Kh-101/555 air launched cruise missiles (ALCM) from Tu-95s strategic bombers, Kalibrs from Black Sea ships and submarines and Iskander-M ballistic missiles (8). On the same day „after ballistic- and cruise missile strikes knocked out a number of Ukrainian early warning radars in the Kyiv area, the Russian ground forces began deploying heavy electronic countermeasures. Next, an A-50U directed several pairs of high-flying Su-30 and Su-35 interceptors into the skies north of the Ukrainian capital and ordered at least a pair of Mi-8MTPRI electronic warfare helicopters into positions closer to the border. In this fashion, the Russians created a ‚safe corridor‘ down the Dnipro River, along which they intended to conduct their heliborn assault.“(9) As Russia was quite successful with this, several Russian helicopters made their way to Hostomel airfield while those which were destroyed were hit by man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).
During the first week and a half the Russian VKS could fly unhindered deep into Ukrainian air space as the Ukrainian SAMs didn‘t work yet as effectively as planned. Su-30SM, Su-34 and Su-35S flew around 140 sorties per day. There they attacked above all the Ukrainian air defenses and shot down Ukrainian planes. „During the first three days, the primary targets of these VKS strikes were Ukrainian air defences. Over 100 fixed long-range radar installations, bases, munition storage sites and positions occupied by mobile long- and medium-range SAM systems were attacked“ (10). Although the Ukrainian planes also managed to inflict some casualties on the VKS, they suffered heavy casualties as they were technically and numerically inferior.
In March, the Ukrainian SAMs began inflicting significant casualties on the VKS (11).
In April, Justin Bronk, Senior Research Fellow for Airpower and Technology at the Royal United Services Institute, wrote that Russia was unable to conduct successful operations to suppress and/or destroy enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) and that, Ukrainian SAM anti-aircraft defenses made flying at medium or high altitudes in Ukrainian airspace extremely dangerous for Russian planes and helicopters. At low altitudes, the fighter jets and helicopters risked Ukrainian attacks with MANPADS such as the Stinger missiles (12).
In April, Justin Bronk, Senior Research Fellow for Airpower and Technology at the Royal United Services Institute, wrote that Russia was unable to conduct successful operations to suppress and/or destroy enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) and that, Ukrainian SAM anti-aircraft defenses made flying at medium or high altitudes in Ukrainian airspace extremely dangerous for Russian planes and helicopters. At low altitudes, the fighter jets and helicopters risked Ukrainian attacks with MANPADS such as the Stinger missiles (12).
The reasons why Russia can‘t SEAD/ DEAD
As for the reasons why the Russian VKS was unable to conduct such SEAD/ DEAD operations, Alexander Mladenov, an internationally recognized expert on Russian and Eastern European air forces, wrote that the Russian Air Force lacked reconnaissance skills like ELINT/ SIGNIT air platforms (Il-20M, Tu-214R) to localize the important radar installations and C2 nodes of the Ukrainian air defense. A second reason he mentions could be a lack of training needed to perform complex SEAD/ DEAD operations (13). For example, before the invasion, Russian fighter pilots received 80-100 flight hours a year, which is significantly less than the hours of their Western counterparts (14). Bronk emphasizes, besides unsufficient pilot training, that Russian pilots and planning staff lacked the ability to plan, organize, and execute „composite air operations“, coordination of different types of combat aircraft and enablers, which are critical for large scale SEAD/ DEAD operations (15). Another problem arose during the war: the lack of precision ammunition. For the VKS, this meant that they had mostly unguided bombs and rockets at their disposal. In order to deliver such an unguided bomb or missile to the target and to identify targets visually, the Russian aircraft had to fly low. But this put them within range of the MANPADS (16).
As for the mobility problem of Ukrainian GBAD this is because the Russians needed up to 48 hours to attack an already identified target. Cooper, Fontanellaz, Sipos wrote in this regard about the first major Russian SEAD/ DEAD operation in the war in spring 2022, which involved about 40 aircraft and helicopters and lasted six days: „the Russians deployed a number of target drones to prompt into action the PSZSU units they were seeking. As soon as the Ukrainian SAMs powered up, the Il-22M and A-50 would then direct one formation after another of between two and four fighter-bombers into air strikes. Usually a pair of Su-34s […] was escorted by a single Su-30SM or Su-35S armed with Kh-31P or (rarely) Kh-58 anti-radiation missiles. […] after losing three 9A310M1 transporter erector launchers with radar (TELARs) of their Buk M1 systems, the commanders of the Ukrainian firing units learned to not only operate under total emission control but also to change their positions much more frequently than trained for before the war. In this fashion, they began ‚disappearing‘.“(17)
In reaction to these Ukrainian disappearances, three weeks later, the Russians tried a new tactic, sending Su-34 with powerful jammers, escorted by Su-35S first to show themselves on Ukrainian radars, then, in follow-up attacks very low flying Su-24 and Su-25. But here another problem arose: low flying aircraft became targets of MANPADs and Osa-AKM SAM-systems. Thus, still in spring 2022, the majority of air strikes resulted in the release of unguided 80mm or 130mm rockets in the so called lofting or spray and pray maneuvers. In these ineffective maneuvers, the aircraft approaches the target at very low altitude, rises, and at a distance of 400m and an angle of 30-40 degrees launches the unguided rockets. Then the aircraft immediately returns (18).
Besides the use of aircraft for SEAD/ DEAD operations, the Russians also used cruise missiles like Kalibr, Kh-101/55/555 and ballistic missiles like the Iskander-Ms, with the latter ones especially difficult to intercept for the Ukrainians. In the first three days Ukrainian air defenses even were their main targets, but as Ukraine was already warned of the invasion, they had already relocated most of their mobile air-defence systems shortly before their positions were struck by the first wave of Russian missiles, so that their losses were light. Like in the case of the aircraft also here the main problem of the Russians in the following time was the time they needed from the detection of a target until the order to destroy it (19).
Consequences of Russian insufficient SEAD/ DEAD capabilities
In the fall of 2022, the Russian VKS stopped flying many sorties over Ukraine, but mainly used cruise missiles from bombers flying outside of Ukrainian territory. The Russian Tu-95MS and Tu-160 long-range bombers attacked infrastructure in central and western Ukraine with Kh-101 cruise missiles - also to prevent the delivery of military equipment from the West with which and the Ukrainian troops in the east of the country were supplied. However, with limited success, since the Russian long-range cruise missiles are intended for use against non-moving larger targets on the ground with fixed coordinates and not for use against mobile weapon transports. Also, by the fall, the Russians already had fewer Kh-101s at their disposal, and intelligence gathering on the bombers' targets in the western half of Ukraine was largely non-existent. (20)
Of the estimated 20,000 sorties, only about 3,000 had been flown in Ukrainian airspace up to autumn 2022, mainly due to the strong air defenses (21). In December, the British Ministry of Defense wrote: „In recent months, the number of sorties conducted by Russian tactical combat aircraft over Ukraine has reduced significantly. Russian aircraft now probably conduct tens of missions per day, compared to a high of up to 300 per day in March 2022. Russia has now lost over 60 fixed wing aircraft in the conflict.“ (22)
As a consequence the western weapons continued to be delivered to Ukraine. The Kiel Institute‘s Ukraine Support Tracker listed until 28 February 2025 (23): 939 delivered western tanks (among them 80 M1A1 Abrams, 21 Leopard-2A6, 14 Challenger 2) and 1271 infantry fighting vehicles. For air defense Ukraine got 78 SAM systems (among them 12 IRIS-T SLM, 7 Patriot batteries, 14 NASAMS, 2 SAMP/T). As for the artillery they got 84 multiple rocket launchers (among them 44 HIMARS) and 740 howitzers.
Whats about the Russian stealth fighters?
As the number of active Su-57 slowly rises, as mentionned in April 2025 there could be 26 active ones, one could ask oneself if these planes couldn‘t take over a more effective SEAD/ DEAD role as they could approch closer to the target and thus increase the probability to actually hit and destroy that target. Although, with an assumed RCS of 0,1-1m², as mentionned in the Russian patent (24), they aren‘t as stealthy as the US fifth generation fighters, with this RCS they could approach a Patriot air defense system to 50-70km without being detected – if one consideres that the plane is made to be stealthy, above all, from the front (25). An incident supports this assumption: in October 2024 the Russians lost control over an Okhotnik combat drone which was tested to fly with a Su-57 near the hotly contested front at Chasiv Yar. As that drone continued its way into Ukrainian airspace the accompanying Su-57 was ordered to also cross the frontline and down that drone, what it did after having flown about 15 kilometers into enemy air space (26). What is interesting of that is that the Ukrainian GBAD didn‘t react. If one considers that such a system is not deployed directly at the frontline but several kilometers behind it, it is credible that the Ukrainians haven‘t seen the Su-57 entering into their air space.
To implement the idea of using Su-57 for SEAD/ DEAD it could use the Kh-58UShK ARM made to fit into its internal weapon bays. And it would need the help of an ELINT/ SIGINT aircraft which would find the enemy radars. To provoke the Ukrainians to activate these radars the Russians could again use drones or Su-34 equipped with their jammers as in 2022. But even if they decide quickly about an attack and the Su-57 is/ are already waiting close by, the number of these planes limits the extent of these attacks of course. If one even looks a bit further in the future, there is the possibility that the Su-57 really can control up to four Okhotniks (27) which could take over the risky job of entering enemy air space and attack the GBAD. Perhaps this option could encourage Russia to actually use the Su-57 for SEAD/ DEAD as the risk for the plane would decrease.
Russia does have the capability for limited SEAD/ DEAD
The fact that Russia, until April 2025, destroyed, according to Oryx, at least 17 TELAR/TELs for Buk-M1, damaged 5 of these, destroyed 32 launchers for S-300PT and 4 of its radars, damaging one, destroyed 40 launchers and 15 radars for S-300PS, damaged 2 respectively 1, destroyed 2 NASAMS launchers, destroyed a launcher for IRIS-T SLM, damaged a radar, destroyed 2 launchers for MIM-104 Patriot and damaged one of its radars (28) proves that Russia is trying to destroy Ukrainian GBAD and has certain success with that. Interesting is the number of destroyed and damaged launchers in comparison with that of destroyed and damaged radars: 77 destroyed and 2 damaged launchers vs 19 destroyed and 4 damaged radars. That is, four times as many destroyed launchers than radars. This permits to conclude that the weapons the Russians successfully use for DEAD are primarily missiles like Iskander-M or Kh-101/555 and not, as one could assume, ARMs like Kh-31P made for the purpose of destruction of emeny radars. Perhaps they use them but don‘t hit the radars as they launch them from maximum distance or they even sometimes use ballistic and cruise missiles to destroy such radars. Considering that Russian aircraft don‘t enter Ukrainian controlled air space it‘s likely that it is GBAD-radars or Buk-M1 TELARs deployed close to the frontline which is hit by ARMs and not those further away from it.
On the other hand the fact that Russian aircraft still avoid entering Ukrainian controlled air space shows that there is still considerable danger originating from these SAM-systems – as it is unlikely that this fear comes from the danger of Ukrainian aircraft which are inferior to the Russian ones, even the old F-16s Ukraine got.
A Su-57 of course can destroy Ukrainian GBAD, has better chances to really hit the target as it can approach closer to it than fourth generation aircraft. Su-30MK or Su-35S can also do the job with a Kh-31PK with a range of up to 160 kilometers, or a Kh-31PD with the same range. A Kh-58U even has a range of 250 kilometers. The difference is the probability that a target is really hit. There are also some ELINT/ SIGINT aircraft like the Il-20M (about a dozen still fly) or its successor, the Tu-214R (two fly) (29), to find the enemy radar, and tankers for refuelling in the air, the Il-78/ Il-78M, of which Russia currently has 15 (30), which aren‘t even necessary for shorter distances. Another Russian idea is to use Iskander-M ballistic missiles to destroy Ukrainian GBAD, with a certain success (31). A problem seems to be the time which passes between the identification of the enemy GBAD radar and the order to destroy it. It seems that the Ukrainians learned faster to be highly mobile than the Russians to destroy the target.
(1) Ryan Evans, Gen. James Hecker, and Air Marshall Johnny Stringer: Ukraine and Lessons Learned for Airpower and Spacepower, 29.06.2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/06/ukraine-and-lessons-learned-for-airpower-and-spacepower/
(2) Nicholas Myers: The Russian Aerospace Force, 2018, https://wsb.edu.pl/files/pages/634/8-3.pdf
(3) The International Institute for Strategic Studies: The Military Balance 2023, 15.02.2023, https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2023
(4) UK Ministry of Defence: Intelligence update Ukraine, 09.01.2023, https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1612338841544794112
(5) The International Institute for Strategic Studies: The Military Balance 2023, 15.02.2023, https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2023
(6) World Air Forces 2025, https://www.flightglobal.com/defence/2025-world-air-forces-directory/160846.article
(7) Boyko Nikolov: Russian Su-57 aircraft surface online amid delivery doubts, https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2025/04/12/russian-su-57-aircraft-surface-online-amid-delivery-doubts/ , 12.04.2025
(8) Tom Cooper, Adrien Fontanellaz, Milos Sipos: War in Ukraine, Vol. 6: Tha Air War February – March 2022, Warwick 2024, p. 37
(9) Cooper, Fontanellaz, Sipos: War in Ukraine Vol. 6, pp. 41-43
(10) Justin Bronk with Nick Reynolds and Jack Watling: The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence, RUSI Special Report 07.11.2022, p. 8, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/russian-airwar-and-ukrainian-requirements-air-defence
(11) Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans, “List of Aircraft Losses During the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” Oryx, https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-aircraft-losses-during-2022.html
(12) Justin Bronk: Getting Serious About SEAD: European Air Forces Must Learn from the Failure of the Russian Air Force over Ukraine, 06.04.2022, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/rusi-defence-systems/getting-serious-about-sead-european-air-forces-must-learn-failure-russian-air-force-over-ukraine
(13) Alexander Mladenov: Investigating Russia's lack of SEAD/DEAD capabilities over Ukraine, 19.08.2022, https://www.key.aero/article/investigating-russias-lack-seaddead-capabilities-over-ukraine
(14) Justin Bronk: Russia Likely has Local Air Superiority in Donbas, but it May Not Matter, 19.04.2022, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russia-likely-has-local-air-superiority-donbas-it-may-not-matter
(15) Justin Bronk: Russian Combat Air Strengths and Limitations: Lessons from Ukraine, CNA Occasional Paper, April 2023
(16) Justin Bronk: Russia Likely has Local Air Superiority in Donbas, but it May Not Matter
(17) Tom Cooper, Adrien Fontanellaz, Milos Sipos: War in Ukraine Vol. 7: Air and Missile Warfare, March-June 2022, 2024, p. 28
(18) Cooper, Fontanellaz, Sipos: War in Ukraine Vol. 7, pp.37-47
(19) Bronk, Reynolds, Watling, pp. 25-28
(20) Piotr Butowski: Russia’s Secretive Long-Range Bomber Operations Against Ukraine, 14.09.2022, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/russias-secretive-long-range-bomber-operations-against-ukraine
(21) Thomas Harding: Russian air force fails to dominate Ukraine's skies, 07.12.2022, https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/europe/2022/12/07/russian-air-force-fails-to-dominate-ukraines-skies/
(22) UK Ministry of Defence, Intelligence update Ukraine, 5 December 2022, https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1599656286873915393
(23) Kiel Institute: Ukraine Support Tracker, https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/ , accessed 26.04.2025
(24) Многофункциональный самолет с пониженной радиолокационной заметностью , https://poleznayamodel.ru/patent/250/2502643.html
(25) Boyko Nikolov: The Su-57 Felon isn’t invisible to Patriot, NASAMS & SAMP/T, https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2025/03/23/the-su-57-felon-isnt-invisible-to-patriot-nasams-samp-t/ , 23.03.2025
(26) Dylan Malyasov: New details emerge on Russia’s S-70 drone loss over Ukraine, https://defence-blog.com/new-details-emerge-on-russias-s-70-drone-loss-over-ukraine/ , 06.10.2024;
t.me/fighter_bomber /18317 , 05.10.2024
(27) TASS: Two-seat Su-57 fighter jet to be designed for control of Okhotnik drones — source, https://tass.com/defense/1318025?wpmobileexternal=true&wpappninja_v=d7xedfoi0 , 27.07.2021
(28) Oryx - Attack On Europe: Documenting Ukrainian Equipment Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-ukrainian.html, 22.04.2025
(29) Piotr Butowski: Russian Air Power, Stamford, 2023, pp. 220, 227
(30) Butowski, p. 176
(31) for example:
Ellie Cook: Russia Hits Ukrainian Patriot Launchers in Ballistic Missile Strike, https://www.newsweek.com/russia-ukraine-patriot-launcher-radar-iskander-ballistic-missile-strike-dnipropetrovsk-1966978 , 10.10.2024
Boyko Nikolov: Four US-made Patriot launchers struck in combat, Russia says, https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2024/12/19/four-us-made-patriot-launchers-struck-in-combat-russia-says/ , 19.12.2024
Military Watch Magazine: Russian Iskander-M Ballistic Missile Strike Takes Out One of Ukraine’s Last S-300 Air Defence Systems, https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-iskanderm-takes-out-ukraine-s300 , 06.01.2025
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